There is considerable evidence that males are more prone to take risks than females. This difference has implications for rates of promotion in hierarchies where promotion is based on random signals of ability. I explore the promotion consequences of three types of performance standards: gender-blind standards, standards designed to promote agents of equal ability on average, and standards designed to promote equal numbers of both genders. These three objectives lead to different promotion standards, which highlights among other things that the goal of affirmative action is not well defined. Lower promotion standards for females can be necessary to ensure either equal abilities or equal numbers in the promoted populations.
Introduction
A±rmative action remains a contentious subject in the regulation of labor markets. Policies that give preferential treatment to women or minorities can be seen as addressing inequities by creating other inequities. For the most part, economists have tried to evaluate a±rmative action policies by their e®ects on e±ciency rather than equity, especially productive e±ciency. See for example, Holzer and Neumark (2000) , who argue from an extensive empirical literature that \a±rmative action o®ers signi¯cant redistribution toward women and minorities, with relatively small e±ciency consequences" (page 559).
At the theoretical level, authors have argued that a±rmative action policies can enhance e±ciency rather that undermine it. Lundberg and Startz (1983) and Lundberg (1991) consider a model of statistical discrimination where wages depend on imperfect signals of ability, and show, among other things, that if workers with di®erent signalling ability are pooled, there is more incentive to invest in human capital. Milgrom and Oster (1987) argue that a±rmative action policies can e±ciently prevent employers from underpromoting women and minorities.
The incentive to underpromote derives from a fear of revealing the worth of their employees to rival¯rms, a threat which is higher for the more \invisible" workers, such as women and minorities.
In this paper I take a di®erent view of both labor markets and a±rmative action. I consider labor market hierarchies, in which promotion to stage t requires prior promotion to stage t ¡ 1: I take investments in human capital as exogenous, and assume that wages at each stage of the hierarchy are immutable. My focus is entirely on rates of promotion, and how they are a®ected by discrimination of various types. Examples of such hierarchies might be ² law, where law students are promoted to associates in law¯rms, associates are promoted to partner, and some partners eventually become judges; ² corporate life, where there is a well-de¯ned executive hierarchy;
² and academic life where undergraduates are promoted to graduate student, graduate students are promoted to assistant professor, and assistant professors are promoted to full professor.
The behavioral premise of the model presented here, which leads to di®erent promotion rates in hierarchies, is that males are more inclined to take risks than females. There is considerable evidence that this is so. An excellent summary can be found in Eckel and Grossman (forthcoming 2003) , who report on experiments that demonstrate, for example, that males and females have di®erent gambling behavior. The evidence is also strong from \¯eld studies" (natural experiments such as observing behavior in placing bets), but less conclusive in \contextual environmental" experiments such as experiments involving insurance choices. One of the most interesting risk-taking contexts is investment. In a study that used measures of risk tolerance reported in the Wall Street Journal, and measures of personality traits developed by psychologists, Stanford and Vallenga (2002) found that males have much higher risk tolerance than females. Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998) came to the same conclusion by observing investment portfolios. Much of the experimental evidence comes from disciplines other than economics. For example, psychologists Ginsburg et al (2002) observed children at a zoo in contexts where the children could choose to engage in a risky activity or not. They concluded strongly that young boys were much more inclined to put themselves at risk than young girls.
I do not wish to leave the impression that this list is exhaustive or even representative, but only to argue that it is much easier to¯nd papers that support a gender di®erence in risk-taking than to¯nd papers that reject it. Many scholars have suggested evolutionary arguments for why it might be so. Dekel and Scotchmer (1999) postulated that males play \winner-take-all" games, and explored a precise sense in which such games do (or do not) lead to riskier behavior.
The premise in that paper, which is also adopted here, is that such behavior is genetically coded. The premise that risk-taking is genetic, rather than a rational response to incentives, or a product of \nurture" rather than \nature," seems consistent with other genetic evidence, such as the fact that males have higher variance than females on dimensions such as longevity, size, and vulnerability to disease.
In this paper, I do not try to explain why males are more risk-taking than females, but simply explore the consequences for promotion in hierarchies. Agents are promoted based on signals of ability that can be noisy. The random process is determined by their genetic coding. This is obviously an extreme and stylized assumption, but one worth exploring if there is any element of truth to it.
I explore the promotion consequences of three alternative types of performance standards: equal promotion standards for both genders, standards designed to promote agents of equal average ability, and standards designed to promote equal numbers of both genders. The intuition for the consequences of these policies are explained graphically in the next section, at least with respect to the¯rst stage of the hierarchy. Perhaps the most important implication of this discussion is that, in such a model, \a±rmative action" has no clearly de¯ned meaning. It cannot be de¯ned without an objective in mind, and the following objectives are pairwise inconsistent:
² equal promotion standards ² equal numbers of promotions ² promotion of a pool of agents with equal average ability.
The next section gives a graphical discussion of how the di®erence in risktaking matters for promotion. This is followed in Section 3 by a more formal discussion that extends to an ini¯nite hierarchy. Section 4 explores alternative interpretations of riak-taking in hierarchies, and in Section 5, I point out some implications for e±ciency. Figure 1 shows the distribution of true ability a, denoted G with density g, in each of two populations, a risk-taking population (males) and a risk-averse population (females). The densityg represents the distribution of signals that the risk-taking population will generate, when their true ability a is confounded by noise. The signal of a random male will be ¾ = a + u, where a is his true ability, and u is distributed according to a cumulative distribution function Á with mean zero.
A Graphical Discussion
Consider the¯rst round of a promotion hierarchy. Suppose that the promotion standard for males is c: That is, every male who generates a signal above c is promoted. The other promotion standards are for females: The promotion standard f e will ensure that females are promoted with the same probability as males, and the promotion standard f a will ensure that the expected ability of promoted females is the same as that of promoted males: If the promotion policy is gender blind, then females are also promoted according to the standard c: The latter is for two reasons: more men than women are promoted, and some of them are mistakes.
The gender-blind policy is clearly inhospitable to females at the¯rst stage, however reasonable it may seem from a procedural point of view. Consider instead an \a±rmative action" policy to promote equal numbers of males and females.
Then the promotion standard for females must clearly be lower than for males, in particular, f e : Even so, ² under an a±rmative action program to promote equal numbers of males and 5 females, promoted females will on average have higher ability than promoted males.
Is this \fair?" An a±rmative action policy aimed at equal numbers is still inhospitable to females in the sense that, on average, promoted females have higher ability than promoted males. Their superior ability is due to the fact that, in promoting males, mistakes are made in both directions. Low-ability males are promoted, and high-ability males are excluded. Females could reasonably argue that the system should impose an even lower bar for females, in order to remedy the discrepancy in average (and marginal) ability.
Consider then an a±rmative action policy aimed at ensuring equal ability of both promoted groups, instead of equal numbers. Then ² under an a±rmative action goal of promoting females with the same expected ability as males, fewer males than females will be promoted; and ² the standard for female promotion should be lower than for males, and even lower than the one than ensures equal numbers.
The much lower promotion standard for females is a bit paradoxical: it appears to favor females of lower ability than males, but in fact the females have higher ability on average. A higher standard must be applied to males in order to compensate for the mistakes.
The graphical discussion only illuminates the¯rst stage of promotion. At the second stage, the pools of surviving males and females are di®erent. Highability males have been eliminated due to randomness, and low-ability males remain. How many agents get promoted at the second stage depends again on the objective. Consider, for example, the gender-blind policy of a common 6 standard. At stage two, the males may still have an advantage due to the new draw of noise that will boost some of them above the bar. However, at stage two, there is a countervailing e®ect. The boost due to noise must be strong enough to overcome the higher ability of the remaining females. At some point in the hierarchy, ability will dominate noise, and males will no longer be promoted in higher numbers. Fewer and fewer males are promoted, but in yet another switcharound, at much later stages of the hierarchy, the only males that remain are those with very high ability who survived their many opportunities to be eliminated.
These issues are considered formally below.
The Hierarchy
Let G be a distribution from which each agent's ability, denoted a 2 R; is drawn We say that the promotion standards are gender-blind if there is a sequence fc t g such that m t = f t = c t for each t:
For females, we can assume without loss of generality that the promotion standards are nondecreasing. If at any point a higher cuto® is followed by a lower cuto®, that is, f t+1 < f t ; then f t+1 can be replaced by f t with no consequence. All the agents with ability between f t+1 and f t have in any case been eliminated at stage t. We will thus assume that ff t g is nondecreasing. Then a female survives to stage t if a¸f t and does not survive otherwise: Hence the probability that a random female survives to stage t is
A male with ability a survives to stage
Hence the probability that a random male survives to stage t is
The expected ability of a random female who survives to stage t is
and the expected ability of a random male who survives to stage t is
We use the following assumptions, which are assumed throughout.
1. The distribution G is symmetric, 1 strictly increasing, has a density g that is strictly quasiconcave and continuous, and has the real line as support.
2. The distribution Á is symmetric and strictly increasing with zero mean and support the real line.
1 For all x in the support, G(x) = 1 ¡ G(¡x):
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We begin with two lemmas. The intuition for the¯rst lemma is that the promoted males include mistakes in both directions. Lower-ability males are promoted by mistake, and higher-ability males are excluded by mistake. Since no mistakes are made in promoting females, the only way to ensure that promoted males have as high ability as females is to promote fewer of them. At the¯rst stage, promoting fewer of them will require that females have a lower promotion standard. At later stages, after males have been eliminated in previous promotion stages, a lower promotion standard for males can still be consistent with fewer promotions or higher ability.
Lemma 3.1. Let fm t g ,ff t g be the promotion standards. The expected ability of a random surviving male is lower than the expected ability of a random surviving female at any stage t at which males have at least as high a probability of survival.
Proof: With a change of variables, y = a ¡ f t ; the females' expected ability conditional on survival to t; (3.3), can be written:
For males, with a change of variables y = a¡f t ; the expected ability conditional on survival to t; (3.4), can be written:
It holds that (3.5) is greater than (3.6) if the following inequality holds for y¸0 : y) ; (3.5) is greater than (3.6) if the denominator of the lefthand side is no smaller than the denominator of the righthand side. The denominators are the probabilities that a male or female survives, respectively. ¤ In the next lemma, the¯rst part re°ects the fact that, regardless of the promotion standards, each male has positive probability of being eliminated at each stage. Since excluded agents cannot re-enter the pool, only few males will survive in the long run.
The second part re°ects the fact that, regardless of the promotion standards, only the males with very high ability will survive many opportunities to be eliminated. Thus, in the \long run", it does not matter very much what the promotion standards are, as long as there is a possibility to be eliminated at each stage. Males that survive will likely have very high ability. In contrast, a female will survive with probability one if her ability is above the maximum promotion standard. This means that more females survive in the long run, even without extraordinary ability. Lemma 3.2. Let fm t g,ff t g be promotion standards that are bounded above and below. Then (1) Given " > 0, there existst such that for t >t, the probability that a male survives to stage t is less than "; and (2) There existst such that for t >t; the expected ability of a surviving male is larger than the expected ability of a surviving female.
Proof: Let m = inffm t g, ¹ m = supfm t g; f = infff t g, ¹ f = supff t g:
(1) Let " > 0: Letã > 0 satisfy 0 < 1 ¡ G(ã) < "=2 and lett satisfy Á(a ¡ m)t < "=2 for all a ·ã: Then for t¸t;
(2) Let ¹ a f be an upper bound on the expected ability (3.3) of surviving females at each stage:
To give a lower bound on the expected ability (3.4) of surviving males we will use the following inequality:
Hence, combining with (3.7):
For t >t; female ability (3.3) is less than male ability (3.4). ¤ I use these lemmas to characterize the consequences of gender-blind promotion standards. (a) ; a random male has a higher probability of survival than a random female, and a random surviving female will have higher expected ability than a random surviving male.
(2) At later stages, t >t for some appropriatet; the probability that a random male survives is smaller than the probability a random female survives, but the expected ability of surviving males is larger than the expected ability of surviving females.
Proof: (1) At stage 1, the probability (3.2) that a male survives can be written as follows with a change of variables x = a ¡ c 1 ; and using symmetry of
The inequality holds because
¡x)dx > 0 due to the strict quasiconcavity and symmetry of g and c 1 > E g (a): Hence (3.2) is larger than (3.1) at t = 1: Using Lemma 3.1, the expected ability of a surviving male is lower than the expected ability of a surviving female.
(2) follows directly from Lemma 3.2 by choosing " > 0 such that (1¡G(f)) > ": ¤ We now turn to alternative policy goals. We¯rst consider the goal of equalizing the probabilities of promotion at each stage, and then consider the goal of equalizing the average ability of the survivors at each stage.
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It follows directly from Lemma 3.2(1) that bounded sequences fm t g,ff t g cannot have the property that males and females have the same probability of promotion at all stages. Part (2) of the following proposition points out that it is impossible to equalize promotion rates with a nondecreasing sequence of promotion standards for males, and in fact, the sequence cannot be bounded below. A nondecreasing sequence of promotion standards would be the natural interpretation of a promotion hierarchy. In order to promote equal numbers of males and females, females must be favored at early stages of the hierarchy, and males must be favored at later stages of the hierarchy, in terms of the promotion standard. (1) If f 1 ; m 1 > E G (a), then f 1 < m 1 (the promotion standard for females is lower than for males at stage 1).
(2) If the sequence ff t g converges to a¯nite limit, then the sequence fm t g is not bounded below.
Proof: (1) follows from Proposition 3.3(1), which implies that if m 1 = f 1 ; males have a higher probability of survival than females. Since the probability of survival is decreasing in m 1 ; the probabilities can only be equal if m 1 > f 1 :
(2) Since ff t g converges, the sequence of female survival rates f1¡ G(f t )g t=1;::: also converges, and the sequence of male survival rates f a) )dag t=1;::: converges to the same limit, say L. Choose an " > 0 such that " < L:
Suppose, contrary to the proposition, that fm t g is bounded below by m: The ,male survival rate at stage t satis¯es
Chooseã;â such thatâ <ã and
Chooset such that (1 ¡ Á(m ¡ã))t < "=3: Then if t >t; the upper bound on the male survival rate at stage t; (3.8), can be written
(Promoting Equal Average Ability) (1) Suppose that the expected abilities of surviving males and females are the same at stage t under the promotion standards fm t g,ff t g : Then the survival rate of females at stage t must be greater than that of males. (2) There are no bounded sequences of promotion standards fm t g,ff t g for which promoted males have the same average ability as promoted females at each t.
Proof: The probability densities of females' and males abilities, conditional on surviving to stage t, are respectively
(1) Suppose to the contrary that (3.2) is at least as great as (3.1). Thus the denominator of (3.10) is at least as great as the denominator of (3.9). Since ¦ t d=1 (1¡Á(m d ¡a)) < 1 at each t; it follows that the density (3.10) is smaller than the female density (3.9) at each a 2 (f t ; 1): The remaining density for males is on abilities lower than the minimum ability for females, f t : Hence the expected ability for females is higher than that for males, a contradiction.
(2) Lemma 3.2 (2) shows that, for any bounded sequences, the average ability of surviving males is higher than the average ability of surviving females for late stages of the hierarchy (large t). ¤
Interpretations
Some of these conclusions can be noticed empirically and others cannot. At most we can observe promotion rules, signals, and proportions promoted, but we cannot in general observe true abilities.
Of course there is the additional problem of identifying hierarchies that have adhered to a particular promotion policy despite the legal and political challenges of the past several decades. It is also hard to identify hierarchies where the same proportions of women and men have wanted to stay in the pool. Instead, women and men drop out at di®erent rates for self-motivated reasons such as child bearing. Nevertheless, I point out two conclusions that would be empirically consistent with this model if data were available:
1. Under a gender-blind promotion policy, the ratio of surviving females to surviving males at early stages of the hierarchy should be smaller than in the original population, but should be larger at later stages of the hierarchy.
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The proportion of females that survive in the limit should exceed their proportion in the original population.
2. Under an equal-abilities promotion policy, the ratio of surviving females to surviving males should be increasing with time, and should be greater at every t than in the original population.
The hypotheses that males generate riskier signals than females, and that the two groups start from identical distributions of ability, can both be challenged. It is thus worth commenting on how this model changes under alternative hypotheses.
First, instead of assuming that males and females have the same distribution of abilities, assume that males have the same mean ability as females, but greater variance. This is also a \riskiness" hypothesis, but one that characterizes the populations rather than behavior. The model can be thought of as one in which males get a single draw of random noise, which persists throughout their working lives. Or, instead of being independent, the draws of random noise in successive periods are perfectly correlated.
With independent draws of random noise, a promoted male is always in jeopardy of being excluded by a subsequent draw, and that is why the survival rate of males is smaller than that of females in the long run. With perfectly correlated noise, the promoted male has no such fear. Like females, he can only drop out at a subsequent stage if the promotion standard is raised. As a consequence, the initial advantage described by Proposition 3.3(1) for gender-blind standards will persist, and there will always be disproportionately many males in the pool, with lower average ability than females.
This discrepancy could be remedied with a sequence of standards ff t g; fm t g that favor females, f t < m t for all t: If the higher signal generated by males is 
E±ciency
The analysis above has been positive and not normative. I have described the paths of promotions that would follow from various promotion standards. Of course the motive behind a±rmative action is a normative one, namely, to redress the apparent inequity of promoting more males than females. We now turn to whether there is an \e±ciency/equity" tradeo®.
E±ciency is hard to de¯ne in a partial model of a labor market such as this.
In fact, since a±rmative action has many faces, its e±ciency e®ects are hard to identify in general, as discussed by Holzer and Neumark (2000) . I will think of e±ciency as being served by the promotion of the most able agents.
If the males' signals were so random that the truth was mostly obscured, it would probably be better to promote only females, for whom the ability is more observable. This wisdom is particularly compelling if the number of agents required at the next level of promotion is small relative to the pool, so that ability is not compromised by promoting enough females to¯ll the slots. The main prescription in this regard is given by Proposition 3.5, which points out that, if equal abilities are desired in the promoted pool, more females than males must survive at every stage. At early stages of the hierarchy, this should be accomplished by giving females an a±rmative-action boost (Proposition 3.3(1)), and at later stages of the hierarchy, equal abilities require that males get an a±rmative-action boost (Proposition 3.3(2)).
When the initial winnowing process promotes less than half the pool { captured in the hypothesis that the promotion standard is on the downward sloping part of the density function { females will initially be disadvantaged under a genderblind policy. However their disadvantage will be overcome at later stages. The 19 disadvantage is self-rectifying. However, both the early-stage inequities and latestage inequities are ine±cient. A better policy would be to increase the promotion of females at the early stages, e..g, by giving them a lower promotion standard (\a±rmative action"), and to increase the promotion of males at later stages, also by tinkering with the promotion standard. This remedy will not be implemented by promoting equal numbers. With equal numbers, according to Lemma 3.1, promoted males are less able than promoted females at all stages.
20

